ACE Research Vignette (043) : Can academic entrepreneurship research identify and explain the next Apple, Google, or (even) Halfbrick studios? by Davidsson, Per
 ACE Research Vignette #043: Can academic entrepreneurship research 
identify and explain the next Apple, Google, or (even) Halfbrick studios?  
 
This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of 
international entrepreneurship researchers. This vignette, written by Professor Per Davidsson, reports findings on the 
extremely skewed distributions of entrepreneurship outcomes and other key variables of interest to entrepreneurship 
research and practice, as well as what this means for what and how we can learn through academic research.   
 
Background and Research Question 
 
Much academic business research relies on available business data (e.g. from ABS or from annual reports) or survey data 
from large samples. In the analysis of such data, researchers tend to rely on statistical techniques where the assumption 
of a “normal distribution” has a central role. That is, most cases are supposed to be close to the statistical average on the 
measure of interest, with relatively few having very low or very high values. This creates something roughly like the 
familiar bell curve in the figure below. We can assume, for example, that the curve represents the varying levels of sales 
revenue that a large sample of business start-ups achieve during their first year in operation. Researchers proceed to try 
to explain this variability of sales with a number of explanatory variables, e.g., the founders’ level of experience and 
education, and how much money has been invested. In the simplest case, each such variable is assumed to have an 
independent and uniform effect across all cases. That is, an extra investment of $1,000 dollars is assumed to have the 
same effect on sales for all cases, regardless of how much was invested already, and regardless of the experience and 
education of the founders. The effect of an extra year of education and experience, in turn, is assumed independent of 
how much is invested. (In reality researchers typically analyse more complex models with more variables and assuming 
contingent effects, but they tend to be extensions of the basic model just described). 
 
.    
But what if the actual distributions of important variables are far from “normal”? The performance of mega-successes like 
Apple and Google (even relatively early in their existence) may have been many orders of magnitude higher than that of 
the “average” start-up. Even a more local success story like Halfbrick Studios—the Brisbane-based creator of Fruit Ninja 
and other games for online devices—may not fit even at the far right of a normal distribution, compared to all start-ups 
from the same year. Further, the most common outcome of start-up efforts may be that they never reach any sales at all 
and thus end up at the far left of the distribution. If so, the truer image may be that of a “Pareto-“ or “Power Law” 
distribution, as depicted by the grey area of the below figure. Such distributions have many cases with low values and a 
few with extremely high ones. The mean of the distribution has little meaning as there is nothing “typical” about it.  
Therefore, our research question is “How are important, entrepreneurship-related variables actually distributed, and what 
does this mean for research and practice?”   
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How We Investigated This 
 
We used four different data sets: the PSED II, covering 1,214 nascent ventures in the US; CAUSEE, providing data on 625 
nascent ventures and 559 young firms in Australia; the Kauffman Firm Survey, which follows 2,034 high-technology firms 
and 2,894 non-high-tech businesses in the US from their first year in operation, and Inc. 5000, which covers high 
performing firms in the US. From these data sets we analysed a number of measures that researchers typically try to 
explain, like the size and growth aspired to and actually attained in terms of sales revenue and employment size. We also 
analysed a number of potential “explanatory” variables, for example: time and effort invested; the founding team’s total 
years of education and industry experience, and the number of previous start-ups they had been involved with.       
 
Findings 
 
Our analysis demonstrated that 49 out of 50 analysed variables were better approximated by a Power Law distribution 
than by a normal distribution. Further, many of the important variables had distributions very closely resembling the 
prototypical Power Law distribution in the figure above. That is, the most common value is zero or close to zero while a 
select minority have values that are many times higher than the arithmetic mean for the variable. Hence, very rarely is the 
assumption of normality fulfilled. 
 
Implications of Research and Practice 
 
Both researchers and practitioners have reason to consider the fact that while the standard toolbox of statistical 
techniques may lead to a correct image of what goes on among the “modest majority” of business start-ups, such 
approaches may not be able to tell us much about what generates the few but important superstars. To learn more about 
the latter one can study known success stories in arrears, but this entails huge issues of selection and post-rationalization, 
and the Inc. sample demonstrates that even within the group of high performers the variable distributions are highly 
skewed. Further, using variable transformations and two- to three-way interaction effects within the basic framework of 
“normal distributions” and “additive linear effects” can only do so much. If the actual mechanisms that generate the 
superstars are more complex, iterative processes that evolve over time, we may need fundamentally different 
approaches to theorizing and testing these phenomena, including computer simulations (see further Crawford et al., 
reference below). Further, researchers will never be able to predict with great precision exactly which emerging ventures 
will become future giants. If they could, they might choose to be investors instead, and very good ones at that—venture 
capitalists ability to pick winners is not that extraordinary, either (see ACE Vignette 030). There is reason to be more 
hopeful that theories and models can get really good at predicting for particular environments (places; industries) roughly 
what number of those rare but hugely important start-ups that transform industries and grow societal wealth that they 
are likely to generate. One highly interesting example of this is Guzman and Stern’s recent work (reference below).    
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